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 The NFL Concussion Litigation:  A Critical 





Charles (“Ray”) Easterling, starting safety for the Atlanta Fal-
cons in the 1970s, would forget the way home when jogging through 
his neighborhood.1  He would walk into a room and forget why he was 
there.2  He would experience severe mood swings and depression.3  In 
August 2011, Easterling4 filed one of the first lawsuits against the Na-
tional Football League (NFL), asserting that the NFL concealed the 
long-term effects of on-field head injury and failed to warn players of 
the risks of harm from repeated concussions.5  As of October 2, 2012, 
more than 155 similar cases on behalf of thousands of former players 
have been consolidated in a multi-district litigation case (MDL) in 
federal district court in Pennsylvania.6  The consolidated mega-case 
seeks, among other things, to certify a national class of  “[a]ll retired or 
former NFL professional football players who reside in the United 
States, who are not now salaried employees of the NFL or any mem-
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 1 Mary Ann Easterling, NFL’s Head Injury Denial Failed My Husband, USA TODAY, Aug. 
15, 2012, at 7A.  
 2 Joseph A. Slobodzian, Concussion Suits Have NFL, Ex-Players On Collision Course, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 29, 2012, at A1.  
 3 Mike Tierney, Football Player Who Killed Himself Had Brain Disease, N.Y. TIMES, July 
26, 2012, at B16.  
 4 Easterling later committed suicide on April 19, 2012.  E.g., Tierney, supra note 3.  The 
autopsy of Easterling’s brain found that he suffered from moderately severe chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy.  Id.; see also infra Part II.  
 5 Class Action Complaint, Easterling v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:11-CV-05209-AB 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Easterling Complaint].  
 6 Plaintiffs/Former Players, NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, http://nflconcussionlitigation. 
com/?page_id=274 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013); see also In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Con-
cussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 31, 2012). 
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ber club, and who have not filed a personal injury action for latent 
brain injury.”7 
In the pantheon of high-stakes class actions, the personal injury 
class action has long been considered dead.8  Too many individual is-
sues, such as causation and medical history, doom the typical personal 
injury case.9  The NFL Players seek to avoid this problem by asserting 
class claims only for “medical monitoring,” a novel theory that allows 
asymptomatic plaintiffs to recover anticipated costs of medical exami-
nations.10   
The problem, however, is that a medical monitoring claim pre-
sents its own individual issues.  Not all states recognize medical moni-
toring as a cause of action, and even among those that do, the ele-
ments vary.11  Like a negligence claim, a medical monitoring claim pre-
sents individualized causation issues.12  In addition, testing and treat-
ment plans can vary from patient to patient.13    
Part I of this essay describes the “NFL concussion” litigation.  
Part II provides a brief overview of the science.  Part III examines the 
current standards for class certification, and Part IV applies these 
standards to the medical monitoring class claims brought by the NFL 
Players.  Part IV notes the courts’ uncertainty on whether medical 
monitoring class actions should be treated as an injunctive class under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or as a damages class under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).14  Regardless of which cate-
gory medical monitoring falls into, Part IV concludes that the players’ 
medical monitoring claim as currently pled fails to satisfy the criteria 
for class certification.  This does not mean that these plaintiffs have no 
redress against the NFL.  It means only that the NFL Players need to 
employ the traditional personal injury lawsuit—not the class action 
device—to pursue their relief.  
                                                                                                                           
 7 Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Class Action Complaint for Medical Monitoring ¶ 16, 
In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-AB, MDL No. 
2323 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012) [hereinafter Master Class Action Complaint], ECF No. 84. 
 8 See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 
(2007); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “certifi-
cation of mass tort litigation classes has been disfavored.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (discussing problems 
of satisfying Rule 23(b)(3) where plaintiffs alleged exposure to asbestos caused harm). 
 10 E.g., D. Scott Anderson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Ap-
proach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1096-97 (2005).   
 11 E.g., id. at 1114-17; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
 12 See sources cited infra notes 222-26.  
 13 See infra Part III.  
 14 See infra Part IV. 
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I. THE LAWSUITS 
Suits about concussions are not new.  The first concussion15 law-
suit involving a professional football player was filed sixteen years ago 
by Merril Hoge, a former running back for the Pittsburgh Steelers and 
the Chicago Bears.16  In 1996, Hoge filed a medical malpractice action 
against Dr. John Munsell, the team physician.17  Hoge claimed that Dr. 
Munsell failed to warn him about the risks of returning to the game 
too quickly after a concussion.18  After a two-week trial in June 2000, 
the jury awarded Hoge $1.55 million in damages.19    
                                                                                                                           
 15 “[T]here is no universal agreement on the [medical] definition of a concussion.”  Robert 
C. Cantu, Return to Play Guidelines After a Head Injury, 17 CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 45, 52 
(1998).  Generally speaking, however, a concussion is a traumatically induced alteration in brain 
function.  See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 90-94; see generally CHRISTOPHER 
NOWINSKI, HEAD GAMES – FOOTBALL’S CONCUSSION CRISIS FROM THE NFL TO YOUTH 
LEAGUES 24-25 (2007).  Concussions are prevalent in football and boxing, which both involve 
violent contact, but can occur in all major sports.  See Daniel H. Daneshvar et al., The Epidemi-
ology of Sports-Related Concussion, 30 CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 1, 3-5 (2011) (reporting concus-
sion rates for football, baseball, basketball, cheerleading, ice and field hockey, and soccer).  In 
2011, for example, eleven Major League Baseball players were placed on the disabled list due to 
concussions and head injuries.  Jon Paul Morosi, MLB Gets Stringent with Concussions, FOX 
SPORTS (June 15, 2012, 10:03 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/mlb-gets-tough-with-
concussions-7-day-disabled-list-designed-to-protect-players-061412.  
 16 Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The 
Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL. J. SPORT L. 17, 26 (2002).  Hoge recently created controversy 
when he said it was “irresponsible” to suggest that football was a dangerous game for children.  
Michael David Smith, Merril Hoge: Kurt Warner Is Uneducated and Irresponsible, NBC SPORTS 
(May 4, 2012, 4:58 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/05/04/merril-hoge-kurt-
warner-is-uneducated-and-irresponsible/.  
 17 Hecht, supra note 16, at 27. Hoge’s suit was the first by a professional football player.  
See id. at 30.  Similarly, in March 2010, a former player in the Arena Football League filed a 
malpractice action against the Colorado Crush’s team doctor.  E.g., Alan Schwarz, Lawsuit Cites 
Mishandling of Football Concussion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at B17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/sports/football/19concussions.html?_r=0. 
 18 Hecht, supra note 16, at 21.  This risk can include “Second Impact Syndrome,” where a 
second blow to the brain causes the athlete to suffer brain stem failure, resulting in respiratory 
failure and sometimes death.  E.g., Robert C. Cantu, Second-Impact Syndrome, 17 CLINICS IN 
SPORTS MED. 37, 37-44 (1998).  Hoge suffered a concussion during a preseason game in August 
1994 against the Kansas City Chiefs.  Hecht, supra note 16, at 26; see also John Mangels, Players 
Say NFL Ignored Dangers of Concussions, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 27, 2012, at A1.  
“Five days later, without a neurological exam, a doctor cleared him by phone to play.” Mangels, 
supra note 18.  At an October 2nd game against the Buffalo Bills, Hoge suffered a second con-
cussion and stopped breathing.  Id.  After this concussion, Hoge had to keep his home phone 
number in his wallet in case he forgot how to get home.  Peter Kerasotis, Hoge’s Story Should Be 
Warning to NFL, FLORIDA TODAY, Mar. 20, 2011.  Less than two weeks later, Hoge retired from 
the NFL.  Hecht, supra note 16, at 27.   
 19 Hecht, supra note 16, at 28-29.  The parties subsequently settled the lawsuit for undis-
closed terms.  Schwarz, supra note 17.  For a thorough discussion of the Hoge case, see Hecht, 
supra note 16, at 25-30, and Daniel J. Kain, “It’s Just A Concussion:” The National Football 
League’s Denial of A Casual Link Between Multiple Concussions And Later-Life Cognitive De-
cline, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 697, 713-17 (2008).  
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What is new in concussion litigation is the defendant.  Players are 
no longer bringing individual medical malpractice suits against team 
physicians; instead, they are suing the NFL itself.20  In July 2011, more 
than seventy former NFL players and their spouses filed the first law-
suit against the NFL21 in Los Angeles County Superior Court.22  De-
spite the large number of plaintiffs, the suit was not brought as a class 
action.23   
This first case, however, opened the doors.  Courts across the 
country were inundated with no less than 155 suits,24 including twelve 
class actions.25  While the class actions all essentially sought to repre-
sent the same putative class of former players, the class complaints 
varied in significant respects.26  Some class complaints asserted claims 
                                                                                                                           
 20 E.g., Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, In re Nat’l 
Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2012), ECF 
No. 2642.  At least one case also has named the individual clubs as defendants.  E.g., Complaint, 
Woods v. NFL,  No. 12-10107 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 26, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3802438 (naming 
Miami Dolphins, Detroit Lions, Buffalo Bills, Philadelphia Eagles and Tennessee Titans as de-
fendants).  
 21 Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, ¶¶ 1-85, Maxwell v. Nat’l 
Football League, No. BC 465 842 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Maxwell Complaint].  
The complaint named the National Football League, as well as NFL Properties, LLC, as defen-
dants.  In addition, the complaint named various defendants related to Riddell, Inc., a helmet 
manufacturer.  The complaint brought products liability – design defect, manufacturing defect, 
failure to warn, and negligence – claims against the Riddell defendants.  See id. ¶¶ 567-586. 
 22 The NFL, with the consent of the Riddell defendants, successfully removed the action to 
the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of federal 
question jurisdiction.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Transfer and Coordination 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 at 2, In re Nat’l Football League Litig., MDL No. 2323 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 
15, 2011).  The defendants argued that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
completely preempted plaintiffs’ claims.  Id.  This argument also forms the basis of the defen-
dants’ motion to dismiss.  Memorandum of Law of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL 
Properties LLC In Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master Admin. Long-Form 
Complaint on Preemption Grounds, In re Nat’l Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 3589. 
 23 See generally Maxwell Complaint, supra note 21.  Lead plaintiff Vernon Maxwell played 
professional football for six seasons, and suffered multiple concussions during his pro career.  Id. 
¶¶ 150-51.  The Complaint alleged that Maxwell suffers from various symptoms including mem-
ory loss and headaches.  Id. ¶ 153.  The Maxwell Complaint alleged that the NFL breached its 
duty to protect its players by failing to warn players of the risks of repeated concussions, id., and 
by failing to institute rules preventing a player from returning to play after a concussive blow.  
Id. ¶¶ 533, 548.  The Maxwell Complaint further alleged that “[f]or decades, Defendants have 
known that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term brain injury,” but that the NFL 
“made . . . material misrepresentations . . . that there was no link between concussions and later 
life cognitive/brain injury.”  Id. ¶¶ 113, 124-25, 556.  The Maxwell plaintiffs brought causes of 
action for negligence, “negligent-monopolist,” fraud and loss of consortium against the NFL.  See 
generally id. 
 24 Plaintiffs/Former Players, supra note 6.  
 25 See discussion infra Part I.A.  
 26 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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for negligence and fraud,27 while others brought only medical monitor-
ing claims.28  The class complaints further differed in whether class cer-
tification was sought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 
or 23(b)(3).29  Ultimately, the number of cases grew so large that the 
cases were consolidated into a federal multidistrict litigation where 
plaintiffs filed a master class action complaint. 30 
A. The Complaints 
The first class action against the NFL was filed in August 2011 by 
Charles Easterling in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.31  The complaint asserted claims for negli-
gence, civil conspiracy, concealment, and medical monitoring.32  The 
Easterling complaint sought certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3) of a nationwide class of all former NFL players 
who sustained a concussion while playing in the NFL and who have, 
since retirement, developed physical or mental problems as a result.33  
On the medical monitoring claim, the Easterling complaint expanded 
the class to include current players and future players who suffer a 
concussion or “concussion like symptoms”34 and also sought certifica-
tion under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).35    
                                                                                                                           
 27 E.g., Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint for Damages, And Demand for 
Jury Trial, Jacobs v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-CIV-9345 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011). 
 28 E.g., Class Action Complaint, Wooden v. Nat’l Football League, No. 1:12-CV-20269-JEM 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2012). 
 29 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 30 NFL Asks Federal Judge to Dismiss Concussion Lawsuits, NFL.COM (Aug. 30, 2012 9:52 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000056716/article/nfl-asks-federal-judge-to-dismiss-
concussion-lawsuits; see also Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7. 
 31 Easterling Complaint, supra note 5.  
 32 See generally id.  
 33 Id. ¶¶ 31-34.  The complaint further divided the class into five sub-classes based on the 
time period in which the player was employed by a member team.  Id.  
 34 Id.  ¶ 59.   
 35 Id. 
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A wave of similar class action complaints followed.36  Two were 
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.37  These complaints, by putative class representatives Harry 
Jacobs and Reginald Rucker, brought identical38 class action allega-
tions; each sought certification of a nationwide class of former profes-
sional football players “who were employed by any member club” of 
the NFL.39  The Rucker complaint brought class claims under theories 
of fraud and medical monitoring,40 while the Jacobs complaint addi-
tionally asserted a negligence class claim.41  Both sought certification 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).42 
Three more class action suits were filed in January 2012.43  One 
complaint filed by Andrew Glover, who played for the Raiders, Vi-
kings, and Saints over his ten-year career,44 used the identical class ac-
tion allegations and claims set forth in the Jacobs and Rucker com-
plaints.45  Like the Rucker and Jacobs complaints, Glover sought class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2).46  The other complaint, by Ron Solt, 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint for Damages, and Demand for 
Jury Trial, Rucker v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-CIV-9538 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter 
Rucker Complaint]; Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint for Damages, and Demand 
for Jury Trial, Jacobs v. Nat’l Football League, No. 11-CIV-9345 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) [herein-
after Jacobs Complaint]; Class Action and Individual Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial, Glover 
v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-CV-00287-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter 
Glover Complaint]; Plaintiffs’ Class Action and Individual Complaint, Solt v. Nat’l Football 
League, No. 2:12-CV-00262-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Solt Complaint]; Class Ac-
tion Complaint, Wooden v. Nat’l Football League, No. 1:12-CV-20269-JEM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 
2012) [hereinafter Wooden Complaint]; Class Action Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, 
Hughes v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-CV-00459 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2012), ECF No. 1 [herein-
after Hughes Complaint]; Class Action Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, Brooks v. Nat’l 
Football League, No. 2:12-CV-00941 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Brooks Complaint]; 
Class Action Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-
CV-01034 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Jackson Complaint]; Class Action Complaint and 
Request for Jury Trial, Granger v. Nat’l Football League, No. 2:12-CV-01303 (E.D. La. May 18, 
2012) [hereinafter Granger Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, LeMaster v. Nat’l Football 
League, No.120302540 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter LeMaster Complaint]; 
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Haddix v. Nat’l Football League, No. L-1363-
12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Haddix Complaint].  
 37 See Jacobs Complaint; supra note 36; Rucker Complaint, supra note 36.  
 38 Compare Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 15-20, with Rucker Complaint, supra note 
36, ¶¶ 84-89. 
 39 Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 16; Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 85.   
 40 Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 97-111. 
 41 Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, at Count III. 
 42 Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 84; Jacobs Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 15.   
 43 E.g., Wooden Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Jan. 24, 2012); Solt Complaint, supra note 
36 (filed Jan. 18, 2012); Glover Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Jan. 19, 2012).  
 44 Glover Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 13.  
 45 Compare Glover Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 84-89, with Jacobs Complaint, supra note 
36, ¶¶ 15-20, and Rucker Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 84-89. 
 46 Glover Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 84.  
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a former offensive lineman for the Indianapolis Colts and the Phila-
delphia Eagles,47 started with the same class definition of “all retired or 
former professional football players in the United States who were 
employed by any member club” of the NFL,48 but identified three sub-
classes: the Non-Concussion Subclass,49 the Symptomatic Subclass,50 
and the Concussion Subclass.51  Solt sought certification under all 
three categories of class action: Rules 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).52  
The third class action filed in January 2012, Wooden v. NFL, originally 
defined a limited class focused on second-impact syndrome,53 but later 
revised the class definition to the now-standard, “[a]ll retired or for-
mer professional football players in the United States.”54  Wooden as-
serted only a medical monitoring claim on behalf of the class55 and did 
not identify the specific type of class action asserted.56 
At least one concussion-related class action was filed against the 
NFL per month from February to May 2012.57  Three federal com-
plaints—Jackson v. NFL, Brooks v. NFL, and Granger v. NFL—
defined the class as “[a]ll persons, and spouses of persons, who sus-
tained one or more concussions, or suffered concussion like symptoms, 
while playing in an NFL football game and who has developed or will 
develop mental or physical problems as a result of the concussions or 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Solt Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 11.  
 48 Id. ¶ 41. 
 49 Id. ¶ 42.  The Non-Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll other Class members who are 
asymptomatic and did not sustain any concussion while playing football in the NFL, as deter-
mined by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole.”  Id. 
 50 Id. ¶ 43.  The Symptomatic Subclass included: 
[a]ll Class members who suffered and/or presently suffer from conditions and/or symptoms 
as a result of one or more concussion(s), or from concussion-like symptoms and/or concus-
sion-related conditions from repetitive traumatic brain injury, such conditions and/or symp-
toms including concentration problems, memory loss, mood swings, personality changes, 
headache, fatigue, dizziness, insomnia and excessive drowsiness; episodic disorientation; lack 
of insight, poor judgment, poor to little impulse control; signs and symptoms of Parkinson’s 
Disease or Alzheimer’s Disease (and other conditions that discovery may reveal are related) 
from their playing football in the NFL. 
Id. 
 51 Id. ¶ 44.  The Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll Class members who are asymptomatic 
but have sustained one or more concussion(s), as determined by the medical monitoring con-
ducted on the Class as a whole, while playing football in the NFL.” Id. 
 52 Id. ¶ 40. 
 53 Wooden Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 18. 
 54 Amended Complaint – Class and Mass Action ¶ 889, Wooden v. Nat’l Football League, 
2:12-CV-01037 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Amended Wooden Complaint].   
 55 Id. ¶¶ 958-68.  
 56 Id. ¶ 964 (seeking certification “[p]ursuant to Rule 23”).   
 57 See Hughes Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Feb. 17, 2012); LeMaster Complaint, supra 
note 36 (filed Mar. 21, 2012); Haddix Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Mar. 21, 2012); Jackson 
Complaint, supra note 36 (filed Apr. 23, 2012); Granger Complaint, supra note 36 (filed May 18, 
2012).  
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concussion like symptoms.”58  This definition thus encompassed both 
former and current players.59  Brooks, Granger, and Jackson asserted 
only a medical monitoring claim on behalf of the class60  and sought 
certification under both Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).61  A fourth federal 
complaint, Hughes v. NFL, used a class definition essentially identical 
to the Easterling complaint.62  Hughes invoked both Rules 23(b)(2) 
and (b)(3) in support of class certification.63  One of the class action 
complaints was filed in state court but removed to federal court by the 
NFL.64  This complaint, LeMaster v. NFL, essentially used the same 
class definition as the Solt case, but limited the class to Pennsylvania 
residents:65 “[a]ll retired or former professional football players domi-
ciled in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who were employed by 
any member club” of the NFL.66 Like the Solt Complaint, the LeMas-
ter Complaint identified three sub-classes: the Non-Concussion Sub-
class,67 the Symptomatic Subclass,68 and the Concussion Subclass.69  
                                                                                                                           
 58 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 122; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 130; 
Brooks Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 106.   
 59 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 185; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 209. 
 60 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 179-85; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 198-
209; Brooks Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 163-69. 
 61 Jackson Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 122; Granger Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 130; 
Brooks Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 106. 
 62 Compare Hughes Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 115, with Easterling Complaint, supra note 
5, ¶ 34.  The Hughes Complaint defined the class as “[a]ll persons, and spouses of persons, who 
sustained one or more concussions, or suffered concussion like symptoms, while playing in an 
NFL football game and who has developed or will develop mental or physical problems as a 
result of the concussions or concussion like symptoms.”  Hughes Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 115.    
 63 Hughes Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 115. 
 64 See Docket, LeMaster v. Nat’l Football League, No. 120302540 (Phila. Ct. Comm. Pl. 
Mar. 21, 2012) (noting Notice of Removal by National Football League filed on May 7, 2012).  A 
second class action complaint was filed during this time period in New Jersey state court.  See 
Haddix Complaint, supra note 36.  The Haddix case was removed to federal court and trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 
the MDL Order.  See Conditional Transfer Order (CTO-12), In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 2323 (J.P.M.L. June 14, 2012); see also infra Part I.B.  In the 
MDL, the Haddix plaintiffs subsequently dropped the class allegations from their short form 
complaints.  Short Form Complaints, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., No. 2:12-CV-03532-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2012), ECF Nos. 2-4 (filed by Gregory Brown, 
Lawrence Watkins and Michael Haddix, lead plaintiffs in the state class action).       
 65 Compare LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 22-25, with Solt Complaint, supra note 
36, ¶¶ 41-44. 
 66 LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 22. 
 67 Id. ¶ 23.  The Non-Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll other Class members who are 
asymptomatic and did not sustain any concussion while playing football in the NFL, as deter-
mined by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole.”  Id. 
 68 Id. ¶ 25.  The Symptomatic Subclass included: 
[a]ll Class members who suffered and/or presently suffer from conditions and/or symptoms 
as a result of one or more concussion(s), or from concussion-like symptoms and/or concus-
sion-related conditions from repetitive traumatic brain injury, such conditions and/or symp-
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LeMaster invoked the state-law equivalents of Rules 23(b)(2) and 
(b)(3).70  
B. The MDL & Master Administrative Complaint  
Facing these multiple class actions as well as thousands of indi-
vidual claims, the NFL filed a motion to consolidate the concussion 
cases with the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.71  With little analysis, the Panel granted 
the NFL’s motion.72  With Solt, Glover, and Easterling already pending 
before Judge Anita Brody of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania,73 the Panel centralized the MDL be-
fore Judge Brody.74  The MDL now involves over 4,000 players in over 
200 complaints.75 
Pursuant to a case management order,76 plaintiffs filed two master 
administrative complaints, one for individual claims77 and the other a 
class action for medical monitoring.78  The new master class action 
complaint (“Master Class Complaint”) included all eleven of the 
separate class actions,79 as well as a new class action led by putative 
class representative Gerald Allen, a former running back for the Bal-
timore Colts and Washington Redskins.80  The apparent purpose of the 
                                                                                                                           
toms including concentration problems, memory loss, mood swings, personality changes, 
headache, fatigue, dizziness, insomnia and excessive drowsiness; episodic disorientation; 
lack of insight, poor judgment, poor to little impulse control; signs and symptoms of Parkin-
son’s Disease or Alzheimer’s Disease (and other conditions that discovery may reveal are 
related) from their playing football in the NFL. 
Id. 
 69 LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶ 24.  The Concussion Subclass included “[a]ll Class 
members who are asymptomatic but have sustained one or more concussion(s), as determined 
by the medical monitoring conducted on the Class as a whole, while playing football in the NFL.”  
Id. 
 70 LeMaster Complaint, supra note 36, ¶¶ 21-25 (citing Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1708(a) & (b)).   
 71 Section 1407 allows consolidation for pretrial proceedings where pending civil actions in 
different districts involve “one or more common questions of fact.”  28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).   
 72 Order, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-
AB, MDL No. 2323 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF No. 1.   
 73 See sources cited supra note 36.   
 74 See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1378 
(J.P.M.L. Jan. 31, 2012).   
 75 See generally Plaintiffs/Former Players, supra note 6.  
 76 Case Management Order No. 2, In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 2012), ECF No. 64.   
 77 Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-MD-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012), 
ECF No. 83. 
 78 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7. 
 79 See discussion supra Part I.A.  
 80 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 5.  
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Master Class Complaint is to identify appropriate class representa-
tives for both a national class as well as two state-wide classes.81 
Unlike the original class complaints,82 the Master Class Complaint 
asserts a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) only.83  
The complaint alleges six common questions of law or fact that war-
rant class certification: liability on a claim for medical monitoring; de-
fendant’s affirmative defenses; causation; “[w]hether medical monitor-
ing is reasonably necessary for members of the Class to obtain early 
diagnosis of latent brain injury;” “[w]hether such monitoring is be-
yond the routine medical care provided to men of a similar age as 
members of the Classes;” and “[w]hether early diagnosis of latent 
brain injury will lead to improved treatment for the medical, cognitive, 
psychological and behavioral sequelae of the latent brain injury.”84  
The class identifies a “national class,” defined as “[a]ll retired or for-
mer NFL professional football players who reside in the United 
States, who are not now salaried employees of the NFL or any mem-
ber club, and who have not filed a personal injury action for latent 
brain injury.”85  Alternatively, the Master Class Complaint defines two 
state class actions for California and Florida residents.86 
The Master Class Complaint asserts an independent medical 
monitoring claim under New York law on behalf of the national class.87  
The class seeks an “injunction creating a Court-supervised NFL-
funded comprehensive medical monitoring program for the Plaintiffs 
and the members of the Class,” in the form of a trust fund.88  Addition-
ally, the complaint brings a fraudulent concealment/negligent omission 
claim and seeks medical monitoring as a remedy.89 
II. THE SCIENCE  
In simplest terms, a concussion occurs when external force causes 
the brain to hit the skull inducing an alteration in brain function.90  
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. ¶¶ 5-9. 
 82 See discussion supra Part I.A.  
 83 Master Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 15.  
 84 Id. ¶ 22.   
 85 Id. ¶ 16. 
 86 Id. ¶¶ 18-19.   
 87 Id. ¶¶ 233-44. 
 88 Id. ¶¶ 242-44.   
 89 Id. ¶¶ 245-57. 
 90 See Cantu, supra note 15, at 52; Sarah Cobb & Barbara Battin, Second-Impact Syn-
drome, 20 J. SCH. NURSING 262, 262 (2004) ; see generally NOWINSKI, supra note 15, at 24-25. 
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Loss of consciousness is not required for a concussion to occur.91  Neu-
rological exams, such as magnetic resonance imaging or electroen-
cephalograms, typically do not detect a concussion.92  Rather, diagnos-
ticians must rely on clinical symptoms such as dizziness or nausea.93  
Many use the “Cantu grading system”, developed by Dr. Robert C. 
Cantu, co-founder of the Sports Legacy Institute, which categorizes 
concussions based on whether the player loses consciousness and suf-
fers amnesia.94 
When the brain experiences frequent trauma, Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy (CTE) may occur in the brain.95  CTE is a neurode-
generative disease caused by the accumulation of naturally occurring 
tau proteins in individual nerve cells thereby preventing the cells from 
connecting with other nerve cells and eventually “killing the cells.”96  
In simpler terms, the tau proteins operate “sort of like sludge, which 
clogs up the brain cell.”97  Dr. Ann McKee, a leading researcher on 
CTE, has developed a four-tier grading system for CTE: 
In Grade 1, a few hot spots appear on the surface, clustered 
around small blood vessels . . . . In Grade 2, the spots multiply but 
most brain tissue is undisturbed . . . . In Grade 3, the neurofibu-
lary tangles she likens to skeins of unraveling yarn invade multi-
ple lobes of the brain.  Besieged, the medial temporal lobe atro-
phies.  The hippocampus, essential for memory and learning, is at-
tacked.  The amygdale, which governs aggressiveness and rage, is 
assaulted . . . .  Grade 4, a more florid form of Grade 3, is gener-
ally only seen in those who live with the disease longer.98  
Clinically, CTE presents cognitive, mood, and behavioral symp-
toms.99  Initially called “punch drunk syndrome” because of its associa-
                                                                                                                           
 91 Mark Aubry, et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the First International Confer-
ence on Concussion in Sport, Vienna 2001, 36 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 6, 6 (2002), available at 
http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/36/1/6.full; accord Cobb & Battin, supra note 90, at 263. 
 92 Cobb & Battin, supra note 90, at 262.  Indeed, after a concussion, “brain scans are [usu-
ally] normal because the injury is metabolic rather than structural.”  Id. 
 93 Id. at 262-63.   
 94 Cantu, supra note 15, at 53-56. 
 95 Robert C. Cantu, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in the National Football League, 61 
NEUROSURGERY 223, 223-24 (2007).  
 96 Legal Issues Relating to Football Helmet Injuries (Part I & II): Hearings Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1, 153 (2010) (statement of Dr. Ann C. McKee) [hereinafter 
Helmet Injuries Hearings]; see also id. at 67 (statement of Dr. Robert Cantu).  
 97 Id. at 212 (statement of Dr. Julian Bailes). 
 98 Jane Leavy, The Woman Who Would Save Football, GRANTLAND (Aug. 17, 2012),  
http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/8218700/neuropathologist-dr-ann-mckee-accused-killing-
football-be-sport-only-hope.  
 99 Cantu, supra note 95, at 223-24; accord Christine M. Baugh et al., Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy: Neurodegeneration Following Repetitive Concussive and Subconcussive Brain 
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tion with boxers, CTE was first described in 1928 by Dr. Harrison S. 
Martland, a New Jersey pathologist.100  Dr. Martland described the 
“punch drunk” boxer as exhibiting “slight mental confusion,” “un-
steadiness in gait,” “hesitancy in speech,” and “tremors of the hands.”101  
He further noted that, in later stages, symptoms “often mimic those 
seen in diseases characterized by the parkinsonian syndrome.”102  Al-
though he could not prove his theory, Dr. Martland attributed these 
degenerative effects to “degenerative progressive lesions” in the brain 
caused by single or repeated blows to the head.103 
Studies in the 1950s and 1960s confirmed Martland’s earlier find-
ings.104  By 1952, moreover, the medical community was recognizing 
that sub-concussive impacts also had the potential to cause brain 
damage.105  That same year, Dr. Augustus Thorndike, a Harvard sur-
geon, issued a medical study addressing college sports injuries, and 
recommended that football players who had been knocked uncon-
scious even once should stop playing the game.106  As of 2009, medical 
literature described 49 cases of CTE since 1928, “39 of whom were 
boxers.”107 
In part, the rather limited number of diagnosed cases over that 
seventy-year period may have reflected the difficulty of diagnosing 
CTE.  “Differential diagnosis of most cases of moderate-severe de-
mentia is difficult just based on current presentation.”108  Rather, CTE 
can be diagnosed only post-mortem.109  Although symptoms are similar 
to other neurodegenerative diseases, CTE is pathologically distinct 
from other diseases including Alzheimer’s disease and Frontotempo-
ral Lobar Degeneration.110  In 1973, Dr. J. A. N. Corsellis identified the 
                                                                                                                           
Trauma, EPUB at 3 (May 3, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/cste/files/2012/05/ 
Baugh_Chronic-Traumatic-Encephalopathy_2012.pdf.  
 100 Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1103, 1103 (1928); see also A. 
H. ROBERTS, BRAIN DAMAGE IN BOXERS 13 (1969) (describing Martland’s work in this area).  
 101 Martland, supra note 100, at 1103.   
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. 
 104 See Ewald W. Busse & Albert J. Silverman, Electroencephalographic Changes in Profes-
sional Boxers, 149 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1522, 1522 (1952).  See generally ROBERTS, supra note 100 
(discussing results of study of traumatic encephalopathy in British boxers).   
 105 See Busse & Silverman, supra note 104, at 1522 (noting that “[i]f the trauma is . . .  mild 
but repeated at intervals that do not permit the brain to return to normal functioning, permanent 
damage may result”).   
 106 Augustus Thorndike, Serious Recurrent Injuries of Athletes – Contraindications to Fur-
ther Competitive Participation, 247 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 554, 555-56 (1952).  
 107 Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, SPORTS LEGACY INSTITUTE, http://sportslegacy.org/ 
research/what-is-cte/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).   
 108 Baugh, supra note 99, at 3. 
 109 Id. at 6, 9.  
 110 Id. at 2.  
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neuropathology of CTE in four different portions of the brain by ex-
amining the brain tissue of fifteen deceased boxers.111  Specifically, 
Corsellis noted neurofibrillary tangles spread diffusely through both 
the cerebral cortex and the brainstem.112 
In 2005, Dr. Bennet Omalu, a forensic pathologist at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh,113 identified the first documented case of CTE in a 
former professional football player.114  In this study, Dr. Omalu exam-
ined the brain tissue of Hall of Fame offensive lineman “Iron Mike” 
Webster115 and found tau protein buildup characteristic of CTE.116  In 
2006, Dr. Omalu confirmed a second case of CTE in a professional 
football player, Terry Long, a former player for the Pittsburgh 
Steelers, who committed suicide by drinking anti-freeze.117  And in 
2007, Omalu diagnosed CTE in a third former football player, Andre 
Waters, a former defensive back for the Philadelphia Eagles and Ari-
zona Cardinals.118  In a telephone interview, Dr. Omalu told the New 
York Times that “brain trauma ‘is the significant contributory factor’ 
to Mr. Waters’s brain damage.”119   
                                                                                                                           
 111 J.A.N. Corsellis et al., The Aftermath of Boxing, 3 PSYCHOL. MED. 270 (1973).   
 112 Id. at 296. 
 113 E.g., Alan Schwarz, Expert Ties Ex-Player’s Suicide to Brain Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 
2007, at A1.   
 114 Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football 
League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128 (2005).   
 115 Webster played center for the Pittsburgh Steelers for fourteen years, and earned the 
nickname “Iron Mike” by “playing six straight seasons without missing an offensive down.”  Art 
Carey, Big Men of the NFL Pay for Their Play Later in Life, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 27, 2003; see 
also Webster’s Estate Triumphs, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 15, 2006), 
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Lifetime, POST-CRESCENT, Nov. 28, 2010 (describing Webster’s career as a “star offensive line-
man”).   
 116 Omalu, supra note 114, at 128; see also Cantu, supra note 95, at 223.  Webster’s estate 
subsequently sued the National Football League for disability benefits under the League’s re-
tirement plan.  See Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 209 Fed. Appx. 
305 (4th Cir. 2006).  A federal judge awarded Webster’s family over $1 million.  See Don Markus, 
Ex-Redskin Player Sues for Added Disability Payments, BALT. SUN (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-29/news/bs-md-shelton-nfl-suit-20101129_1_disability-
doug-ell-cy-smith (reporting Webster’s family received $1.2 million in disability payments); Mi-
chael Leahy, The Pain Game, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2008), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-02-03/news/36840014_1_pain-pills-pain-game-surgeries 
(reporting award of $1.5 million); see also Brett Edwin LoVellette, Comment, “Mortal [K]ombat 
in Cleats”: An Examination of the Effectiveness of the National Football League’s Disability Plan 
and Its Impact on Retired Players, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1101, 1127-33 (2009) (describing Webster’s 
quest for disability benefits).   
 117 Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football 
League Player: Part II, 59 NEUROSURGERY 1086 (2006); see also Cantu, supra note 95, at 223.   
 118 See Cantu, supra note 95, at 223. 
 119 Schwarz, supra note 113. 
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A 2005 study by the Center for the Study of Retired Athletes at 
the University of North Carolina corroborated Dr. Omalu’s findings.120  
Dr. Kevin M. Guskiewicz surveyed more than 2,500 former players 
and found that retired NFL players who had a history of three or 
more concussions were five times more likely to develop “mild cogni-
tive impairment,” and three times more likely to experience “signifi-
cant memory problems” when compared to retirees without a history 
of concussions.121  Another survey by Dr. Guskiewicz in 2007 found 
that “football players with three or more concussions are at a three-
fold risk for sustaining future concussions, and subsequently three 
times more likely to be diagnosed with clinical depression.”122 
In 2008, Boston University Medical School partnered with the 
Sports Legacy Institute to create the Center for the Study of Chronic 
Traumatic Encephalopathy (“Center”), which is dedicated to conduct-
ing research on CTE.123  Between February 2008 and June 2010, the 
Center analyzed the brains of twelve professional football players.124  
All twelve showed evidence of CTE.125  To date, 93% of the profes-
sional football players’ brains tested by the Center have been diag-
nosed with CTE.126 
Still, not all former professional football players have exhibited 
symptoms of CTE;127 Associate Justice Byron “Whizzer” White is a 
notable example.128  Predicting CTE is difficult.  Presently, CTE cannot 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Association Between Recurrent Concussion and Late-
Life Cognitive Impairment in Retired Professional Football Players, 57 NEUROSURGERY 719 
(2005).  
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 122 Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Recurrent Concussion and Risk of Depression in Retired 
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May 8, 2011, at SP, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/sports/football/ 
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 127 See, e.g., Helmet Injuries Hearings, supra note 96, at 67 (statement of Dr. Robert C. 
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be diagnosed during a person’s lifetime.129  Unlike other diseases such 
as Alzheimer’s, “[t]here are neither published and validated clinical 
diagnostic criteria nor biomarkers” for CTE.130   
Indeed, researchers do not yet understand the underlying mecha-
nisms that cause the disease.131  Repeated brain trauma is just one risk 
factor for CTE.  A 2012 Study by the Center noted that “there are 
numerous individuals with a history of repeated brain trauma who do 
not have CTE upon neuropathological examination.  Therefore, con-
cussions and other brain trauma alone are not sufficient to cause the 
disease.”132  “[O]ther factors, including duration of exposure to head 
trauma, age at first exposure, gender, age, race, and genetic predisposi-
tion, may play a role in the development of CTE.”133  For example, in 
congressional testimony, Dr. Robert Cantu noted that the Center had 
identified “a case of CTE in a man who only played football at the 
college level,” and concluded that “some of these individuals have 
entered the NFL already with incipient, if not full-blown, CTE.”134  
Additionally, a player’s position could play a role.135  A recent study by 
Dr. Everett Lehman at the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health found that players in “speed positions,” such as quarter-
backs, running backs, wide receivers, and linebackers, had more than 
three times the risk of dying from a neurodegenerative disease, such 
as Alzheimer’s, than non-speed position players, such as defensive 
lineman.136 
Moreover, although the research suggests that brain trauma is a 
risk factor for CTE, “very little is known about what type, frequency, 
or amount of trauma is necessary to induce the accumulation of these 
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pathological proteins.”137  Recent findings indicate that subconcussive 
impact that does not result in any clinical symptoms may itself be suf-
ficient to initiate CTE.138    
Finally, not all football players with a history of concussions ex-
hibit clinical signs of CTE.  It may be that some players are resilient to 
the disease for various reasons and may remain asymptomatic even 
though their brains will show the tau proteins and other pathologies 
that indicate CTE at death.139  As Dr. Ann C. McKee,140 co-director of 
the Center explained, “[s]ome individuals who are intelligent and have 
great capacity for rewiring their nervous system or taking different 
routes to access the same information can have a lot of structural 
damage without exhibiting any symptoms.”141 
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CLASS CERTIFICATION  
To certify a class action, a plaintiff must satisfy the prerequisites 
of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) 
adequate representation.142  Then, the class action must fit within one 
of the categories of Rule 23(b), specifically either an injunctive class 
under Rule 23(b)(2) or a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3).143  
Wal-Mart v. Dukes
144
 is the Supreme Court’s most recent class ac-
tion decision.  Wal-Mart involved “one of the most expansive class 
actions ever.”145  In Wal-Mart, the district court certified a Rule 
23(b)(2) injunctive class of nearly 1.5 million current and former fe-
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male employees of Wal-Mart who alleged that the company discrimi-
nated against them on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.146  The 
class sought injunctive and equitable relief, including backpay.147  In 
Wal-Mart, the Court clarified two things about class certification.  
First, the Court clarified the meaning of “commonality” under Rule 
23(a).148  Second, the Court added to our understanding of when a 
Rule 23(b)(2) class is appropriate.149  
A. Commonality After Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
As a threshold requirement, Rule 23(a)(2) requires all class ac-
tion plaintiffs to show that “there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class.”150  In Wal-Mart, the Court noted that this “language is 
easy to misread, since ‘[a]ny competently crafted class complaint liter-
ally raises common ‘questions.’”151  Rather, the Court explained that 
“[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class 
members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”152  The Court elaborated 
that commonality requires a “common contention . . . that is capable 
of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth 
or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one 
of the claims in one stroke.”153  In short, commonality requires “com-
mon answers,” not merely common questions.154   
Applying this standard, the Court found that the case did not pre-
sent “even a single common question.”155  The Court noted that the 
plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim was based on an alleged “pattern 
or practice of discrimination” for “literally millions of employment 
decisions.”156  The Court concluded that “[w]ithout some glue holding 
the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossi-
ble to say that the examination of all the class members’ claims for 
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I 
disfavored.”157  In doing so, the Court emphasized that individual store 
managers may have had various sex-neutral criteria for hiring and 
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promotion.158  Responding to the dissent’s criticism that the Court was 
“blending” the commonality requirement with the predominance re-
quirement of Rule 23(b)(3), the Court explained that dissimilarities 
were relevant to determining whether a common question existed.159   
B. Rule 23(b)(2) 
Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class action where “the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”160  In Wal-Mart, 
the Court held that claims for individualized relief are not permitted 
under Rule 23(b)(2).161 
As a threshold matter, the Court noted the defendant’s right to 
raise any individual affirmative defenses.162  The Court explained that 
“[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to 
‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ a class cannot be 
certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate 
its statutory defenses to individual claims.”163  Under this reasoning, a 
Rule 23(b)(2) class should not be certified where the defendant has 
plaintiff-specific affirmative defenses.   
Additionally, the Court subtly changed the mode of analysis for a 
Rule 23(b)(2) class.  Instead of analyzing whether the claim was “equi-
table” or legal in nature,164 the Court instead focused on the “indivisi-
ble nature” of the remedy.165  The Court explained: 
Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declara-
tory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.  
It does not authorize class certification when each individual 
class member would be entitled to a different injunction or de-
claratory judgment against the defendant.  Similarly, it does not 
authorize class certification when each class member would be 
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.166 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. at 2555-56. 
 159 Id. at 2556. 
 160 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).   
 161 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.  The Court left for another day whether Rule 23(b)(2) 
prohibits any claim for monetary relief at all.  Id. 
 162 Id. at 2561.  
 163 Id. (citations omitted).   
 164 E.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 481-82 (1997). 
 165 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557; see also id. at 2560 (noting that it was “irrelevant” that 
plaintiffs’ claim for back-pay was “equitable in nature”).   
 166 Id. at 2557.  
2012] The NFL Concussion Litigation: Class Certification 99 
The Court noted that Rule 23(b)(2) lacked the procedural pro-
tections of Rule 23(b)(3),167 including the opportunity to opt-out of the 
class action168 and the mandatory notice provisions of Rule 23(b)(3).169  
The Court explained that these protections were “unnecessary to a 
(b)(2) class” because the relief of an “indivisible injunction” benefits 
all class members at once.170  The assumption here is that the relief 
benefits all class members equally, so that there should be no need for 
any individualized or case-specific inquiries.  Likewise, notice and opt-
outs have “no purpose” where the indivisibility of the requested relief 
assures that all class members benefit.171   As an example, the Court 
identified the challenges to racial segregation—“conduct that was 
remedied by a single classwide order”—as the quintessential (b)(2) 
cases.172   
This focus on the indivisible nature of the remedy can also be 
seen in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggre-
gate Litigation.  Under the ALI’s approach, “indivisible remedies,” 
which are appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), “generally stand to bene-
fit or otherwise affect all persons subject to the disputed policy or 
practice.”173  Rejecting an analysis that tried to categorize the re-
quested relief “along the law-equity divide,”174 the Principles instead 
urged courts to look at the “practical operation of the remedy.”175  Spe-
cifically addressing medical monitoring class actions, the Principles 
noted that “[e]ven when medical-monitoring claims are allowed, there 
is no basis of aggregating claims that ultimately rely on individual con-
siderations to prove liability.”176 
Finally, reflecting the Court’s concerns about the lack of opt-out 
opportunity in a (b)(2) class, many circuits require that a (b)(2) class 
action demonstrate that the class’s claims are “cohesive.”177  The cohe-
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siveness requirement looks at whether individual issues prevent adju-
dication of the class’s claims on an aggregate basis.178  In Barnes v. 
American Tobacco Co., for example, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit explained that cohesiveness requires that 
the plaintiffs’ injuries must be “group, as opposed to individual inju-
ries.”179    Similar to the predominance inquiry in a Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action, the cohesiveness requirement focuses on a lack of individual-
ized issues.180   
C. Rule 23(b)(3) 
To certify a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), a proposed class 
action must satisfy the elements of predominance and superiority.  
First, a court must find that “the question of law or fact common to 
the class members predominate over any questions affecting only in-
dividual members.”181  Second, the court must conclude “that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”182  “In short, this analysis weighs indi-
vidual issues against common issues: do the claims of the proposed 
class involve facts or legal issues unique to each class member, or can 
the issues be resolved on a class-wide basis?”183    
Both factual and legal differences can raise individual issues.  In 
terms of factual differences, the facts of exposure and each plaintiff’s 
medical history may vary widely.184  In turn, “factual differences trans-
late into significant legal differences.”185  For example, differences in 
exposure or injury can require disparate application of legal rules, 
such as causation and comparative fault.186  Finally, in a national class 
action, “variations in state law may swamp any common issues and 
defeat predominance.”187  Because the court “must apply an individual-
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ized choice of law analysis to each plaintiff’s claims, the proliferation 
of disparate factual and legal issues is compounded exponentially.”188 
IV. CERTIFYING THE MEDICAL MONITORING CLASS ACTION  
The personal injury class action no longer exists, at least in fed-
eral court.189  Recognizing this, the NFL Players have asserted only a 
medical monitoring claim as part of the Master Class Complaint.190  
Although the Supreme Court has rejected a medical monitoring cause 
of action under federal law for railroad workers exposed to asbestos,191 
state courts have struggled with this issue and the resulting “law of 
medical monitoring” has little consistency from state to state.192  For 
example, California has found that medical monitoring is simply a 
type of compensatory damages,193 while Pennsylvania has recognized 
medical monitoring as a “separate and distinct cause of action.”194  On 
the other hand, Indiana does not recognize medical monitoring at 
all.195  Louisiana requires a manifest physical or mental injury,196 while 
Missouri has found a present injury requirement to be “inconsistent 
with . . . the purpose of medical monitoring.”197   
Even within those states recognizing a claim for medical monitor-
ing, the elements vary.198  “Some courts have adopted a lesser standard 
for evaluating how much of an increase in risk plaintiffs must show to 
trigger the medical monitoring remedy.”199  In addition, affirmative 
defenses, such as comparative negligence principles, vary among juris-
dictions.200 
Apparently recognizing the problems posed by multiple state 
laws, the NFL Players assert a medical monitoring claim under New 
York law only.201  The New York Court of Appeals has not addressed 
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the viability of a claim for medical monitoring, but the intermediate 
appellate courts and federal district courts predicting New York law 
consistently have allowed asymptomatic plaintiffs to bring a medical 
monitoring claim.202  Still, “no New York intermediate appellate court 
has carefully considered the elements of a claim for medical monitor-
ing,” and federal courts have described these elements in slightly dif-
ferent terms.203  Using the most recent articulation of these elements 
by a New York federal court, the NFL Players must plead: 
(1) exposure at greater than background levels; (2) to a proven 
hazardous substance; (3) caused by defendant’s tortious conduct; 
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff faces an ele-
vated risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring 
procedure exists that makes early detection possible; (6) the 
monitoring program is different that the program normally pre-
scribed in the absence of exposure; and (7) the monitoring pro-
gram is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scien-
tific principles.204 
Even assuming medical monitoring is a viable legal theory, allow-
ing medical monitoring in the NFL-concussion litigation would ex-
pand the tort in new and novel directions.  The NFL players do not 
allege exposure to “a proven hazardous substance,”205 but rather assert 
that the “repeated traumatic head impact injuries . . . experienced by 
Plaintiffs and members of the Class” satisfy this element.206   
But, putting aside the substance of the plaintiffs’ medical moni-
toring claim, a procedural question has vexed courts confronting these 
claims: Is medical monitoring a claim for injunctive relief or a claim 
for damages?207  In other words, should a medical monitoring claim be 
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or Rule 
23(b)(3)?  Courts are split on the proper approach to medical-
monitoring class actions and the viability of class treatment under ei-
ther (b)(2) or (b)(3).208  The various complaints filed against the NFL 
reflect this split in treatment with some asserting claims under (b)(2), 
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some using (b)(3), and others cautiously covering both bases and in-
voking both (b)(2) and (b)(3).209 
A. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3) 
National medical monitoring class actions, such as the one pro-
posed in the Master Complaint, usually fail the predominance re-
quirement of Rule 23(b)(3) on two grounds.  First, individual issues, 
such as health history, frequency of exposure, causation, and the pro-
posed treatment plan, dwarf any common issues.210  Here, causation 
certainly poses individual questions; each plaintiff will have to show 
that his brain damage resulted from concussions sustained while play-
ing in the NFL, rather than genetic predisposition or concussions re-
ceived while playing football in college or even high school.211  More-
over, numerous courts have found that the element requiring that the 
monitoring program be different than one normally prescribed poses 
individual issues.212  Indeed, the very risk of developing CTE will vary 
from player to player and may depend on the position played.213  Simi-
larly, affirmative defenses, such as comparative negligence214 or as-
sumption of the risk, pose individual issues.215  Indeed, the NFL surely 
will argue that brain damage from concussions is part of the accepted 
risk of professional football.   
Second, the variations in state law concerning the viability and 
elements of a medical monitoring claim prevent certification of a na-
tionwide class action.216  Although plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this 
problem by requesting that only New York law apply to the class, this 
request runs afoul of Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.217  Shutts held that 
every state has an interest in having its law applied to the claims of its 
residents.218  Because plaintiffs are from all fifty states, all fifty state 
laws likely apply to the proposed class action.  But, not all fifty states 
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even recognize a claim for medical monitoring.219  In short, a national 
class action under Rule 23(b)(3) is not viable for the NFL Players.    
B. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) 
Because the majority of courts have denied class certification of 
medical monitoring claims under Rule 23(b)(3),220 the NFL Players 
have turned to Rule 23(b)(2).221  Numerous courts, however, have de-
nied class certification of medical monitoring claims under Rule 
23(b)(2) for a lack of cohesiveness.222  In Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co.,223 
for example, the Third Circuit noted that “medical monitoring classes 
may founder for lack of cohesion . . . because causation and medical 
necessity often require individual proof.”224   Similarly, in In re St. Jude 
Medical, Inc.,225 the Eighth Circuit concluded that “each plaintiff’s 
need (or lack of need) for medical monitoring is highly individual-
ized.”226  Considering a proposed medical monitoring claim for a class 
of heart valve recipients, the court noted that whether medical moni-
toring was necessary depended on “the patient’s medical history, the 
condition of the patient’s heart valves at the time of implantation, the 
patients risk factors for heart valve complications, the patient’s gen-
eral health, the patient’s personal choice, and other factors.”227 
In short, the same individual issues that doom the (b)(3) medical 
monitoring class, such as causation and exposure levels, likewise create 
cohesiveness problems under (b)(2).228 The NFL Players will have an 
uphill battle demonstrating cohesion for a national medical monitor-
ing class based on the risk of concussions.  As Dr. Baugh has ex-
plained, the mechanism for CTE is unclear.229  Concussions alone are 
insufficient to cause the disease.230   Accordingly, individual factors, 
such as “duration of exposure to head trauma, age at first exposure, 
gender, age, race and genetic predisposition” 231 would need to be ex-
amined to determine whether a specific plaintiff faces an elevated risk 
of developing CTE.   Likewise, pre-existing concussion damage from 
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college or high school play will need to be eliminated as a cause.232  
Additionally, under Wal-Mart, the NFL must be able to present case-
specific defenses, such as assumption of the risk and comparative 
fault.233  Finally, given the lack of any treatment options or even mark-
ers for diagnosing CTE,234 any proposed monitoring plan cannot be in 
the nature of an “indivisible remedy.”  Given the infancy of the science 
in this area, it is difficult to imagine a proposed series of medical tests 
that would equally benefit all class members at once. 
CONCLUSION 
Medical monitoring claims generally do not present the type of 
“indivisible” claim described in Wal-Mart as appropriate under Rule 
23(b)(2).  If the idea under Wal-Mart is that case-specific inquiries are 
unnecessary because the relief benefits all class members equally, 
medical monitoring claims fail by definition.  The elements of causa-
tion and medical necessity require consideration of case-specific facts, 
such as frequency and magnitude of exposure, an individual’s medical 
history, as well as the individual risks and safety of undergoing a moni-
toring program.235  Thus, liability turns on the specific facts of each 
class member’s claimed exposure.  Only where the identical risk of 
harm is shared among the class can a medical monitoring claim be 
considered “indivisible” in nature.   
Moreover, under Wal-Mart, it is questionable that the Master 
Complaint presents a question capable of a common answer.  The 
Master Complaint asserts that liability, affirmative defenses, medical 
necessity, the standards of routine medical care for men of similar age, 
and treatment present common questions.236  Apart from the standard 
of routine medical care, however, each one of these questions requires 
an individual answer, not a common answer. At the end of the day, 
should the Master Complaint survive the NFL’s pending motion to 
dismiss,237 class certification of the medical monitoring class should be 
denied.    
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